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Abstract 
A new game-theoretic approach for combining multiple classifiers is proposed. A short introduction 
in basic Game Theory and coalitions illustrate the way any collective decision scheme can be viewed 
as a competitive game of coalitions that are formed naturally when players state their preferences. The 
winning conditions and the voting power of each player are studied under the scope of Banzhaf and 
Shapley numbers, as well and the collective competence of the group in terms of correct collective 
decision. Coalitions and power indices are presented in relation to the Condorcet criterion of 
optimality in voting systems, and weighted Borda count models are asserted as a way to implement 
them in practice. A special case of coalition games, the weighted majority games (WMG) are presented 
as a restricted realization in dichotomy choice situations. As a result, the weighted majority rules 
(WMR), an extended version of the simple majority rules, are asserted as the theoretically optimal and 
complete solution to this type of coalition gaming. Subsequently, a generalized version of WMRs is 
suggested as the means to design a voting system that is optimal in the sense of both the correct 
classification criterion and the Condorcet efficiency criterion. In the scope of Pattern Recognition, a 
generalized risk-based approach is proposed as the framework upon which any classifier combination 
scheme can be applied. A new fully adaptive version of WMRs is proposed as a statistically invariant 
way of adjusting the design process of the optimal WMR to the arbitrary non-symmetrical properties 
of the underlying feature space. SVM theory is associated with properties and conclusions that emerge 
from the game-theoretic approach of the classification in general, while the theoretical and practical 
implications of employing SVM experts in WMR combination schemes are briefly discussed. Finally, a 
summary of the most important issues for further research is presented. This report is a compact 
introduction to the theoretical material upon which a new expert fusion model can be designed. 
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Part I – Theoretical Background 
 
1.1  Preface 
The ultimate goal of any pattern recognition system is to achieve the best possible classification 
performance for the specific problem at hand. This objective has led to the development of 
sophisticated algorithms and classification models in a way that best captures and enhances the 
underlying structure of the input space. As the complexity and intercorrelation between the classes 
increases, more robust and efficient classifiers have to be employed in order to provide adequate 
adaptability and generalization. However, the sensitivity and specificity of each classifier model can 
prove efficient in one case and inefficient in another, thus there is no clear indication of one single 
classifier design that can be considered as a universal pattern recognition solver. 
Recent studies have focused in the possibility of taking advantage of this complementary performance 
of various classifier designs, in order to produce combination schemes for optimal fusion of multiple 
classifiers. Specifically, each classifier is considered as a trained expert that participates along with 
others in a “committee”, which produces a collective decision according to some well-specified rule. 
The most common combination rules include the min rule, the max rule, the median rule, the majority 
voting rule, the averaging rule, etc. 
It has been proven that all these combination rules are special realizations of two basic combinations 
schemes, namely the product rule and the sum rule [01]. The product rule essentially combines the 
classifiers’ estimations on a-posteriori probabilities in a way that is consistent with the classic 
probability theory on independent events. When the classifiers are considered independent, i.e., when 
the decision of each classifier is not affected in any way by the corresponding decision made by all the 
other classifiers, then the join probability of the combined result can be calculated as a product of all 
the individual probabilities. Although the product rule is based on solid theoretical background, 
specifically the Bayes theory, it has provided only moderate results in practice in pattern recognition 
problems. One reason is that, in practice, well-trained classifiers tend to produce similar predictions, 
therefore the hypothesis on independent decisions is not established, although the classifiers produce 
their estimations separately. The other reason for poor performance is the fact that, when the 
combined output of all the experts is based on a product of their individual estimations, one single 
severe error or poor training on one expert could drive the whole group into similarly poor 
performance. 
In contrast, the sum rule utilizes the individual experts’ estimation in some additive form. All the 
popular combination rules, including the majority voting, the median and the weighted averaging rules, 
can be derived from the generic sum rule. It has been proven both theoretically and experimentally 
that these sum-based rules outperform the product rule in terms of minimum classification error 
(MCE) and error sensitivity. The reason for this enhanced performance in comparison to the product 
rule is the fact that the sum form of these rules effectively nullifies any single outliner estimations that 
may be produced by a poor classifier. This means that any single severe error has only minimal effect 
on the final combined estimation. Therefore, any combination scheme that utilizes a sum-based rule 
when calculating the experts’ collective decision is relatively resilient to individual expert errors and 
this property of resiliency is increased as the number of combined experts increases. 
The exact theoretical analysis of any of these combination schemes has proven noticeably cumbersome 
and complex over the years. Recent studies have established some general properties on total error 
magnitude and sensitivity, but only under strict preconditions on number of classes and their 
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distributions [02]. For K classes, current rules cannot guarantee an increase of overall performance for 
the combined decision when each expert exhibits accuracy only at p=1/K. On the contrary, averaging 
rules usually establish increase in performance when each expert exhibits accuracy at least p>0.5. 
Much work has been conducted experimentally for identifying whether the most important factor for 
the final performance of such a combination scheme depends more on the exact form of the 
combination rule or the diversity of the experts themselves. Ensemble design methods, such as 
ADAboost, Random Forests and Arcing [12], focus exactly on enhancing the experts’ diversity, either 
by means of amplifying the classification training process in areas close to the decision boundary, or 
by employing dataset splitting algorithms for improving the independency criterion. However, 
conceptualizing and quantifying diversity between classifier outputs is very challenging and it is 
usually based on experimental results, rather than a solid theoretical basis. As a result, most 
combination schemes employ optimization heuristics when designing the exact form and parameters 
of such a combination rule, e.g. calculating the optimal weights in a weighted averaging model [04]. 
Recently, more generic approaches have been proposed for designing the combination stage of such 
multi-classifier methods. Specifically, instead of employing a fixed rule for combining the individual 
outputs from the experts, a new fully functional expert node is introduced in the form of a meta-
classifier: using the outputs of all the previous K classifiers as input, it produces an arbitrary mapping 
between the K-dim individual decision space into the final output space. This meta-classifier can 
essentially be any linear or non-linear model that is usually trained in the same way any of the other K 
classifiers is trained on the base data. Experimental results for models using neural networks and 
meta-classification nodes have been proven very efficient in many practical problems, justifying the 
practical gain in introducing classifier combination schemes in cases where the complexity of a pattern 
recognition problem requires the use of multiple, highly specialized experts [03]. 
Despite the fact that many practical solutions have been proposed and tested for combining multiple 
classifiers, the core issues of the combination problem still remains: 
(a) Is there a generic and simple way to describe current combination rules? 
(b) Is there an optimal realization of this rule for combining multiple classifiers? 
(c) If such an optimal rule exists, does it cover the non-linear combination schemes too? 
Before these questions can be answered, a brief introduction on special aspects on collective decision 
theory has to be made first. 
 
1.2  Rank and response combination from classifier confidence transformation 
Any classifier combination scheme is restricted by the type and form of the individual participating 
classification models, as their outputs must be compatible and suited for using them in the selected 
combination rule. Classifiers can be generally categorized into three types, according to their output 
[04]: 
 Type-I : the classifier produces a simple statement on class selection 
 Type-II : the classifier produces a ranked list of decreasing preferability of each classes 
 Type-III : the classifier produces assignments of estimated probabilities for each class 
Most combination schemes use Type-I or Type-III classifiers and most of them do not allow mixed 
types. Nevertheless, it is possible to convert between these types in some cases, e.g. assigning simple 
class selections (Type-I) for the maximum estimated probability (Type-III) or for the first preference in 
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a ranked list (Type-II). In practice, Type-II classifiers are more generic than Type-I and Type-III 
classifiers are more generic than Type-II, however it is possible to calculate posterior information 
about the estimated probabilities for each class in Type-II classifiers by examining the produced 
confusion matrix. In fact, many combination schemes that exploit the confusion matrix data have the 
advantage of using already trained classifiers with known performance, instead of applying complete 
re-training of all the K experts when optimizing the combination node [05]. 
The confusion matrix can be considered as an experimental estimation of each classifier’s performance 
on the specific task at hand and it can be used as a measure of confidence related to the predictions 
produced by this particular classifier. Specifically, the elements of the confusion matrix can be used 
directly in a transformation model, where individual correct or incorrect counts can be rescaled and 
mapped in a way that is consistent with a predetermined probabilistic model. Usually, such a 
formulation includes a scaling or normalization function and an activation function that is consistent 
with a specific type of confidence measure. The log-likelihood (linear), the likelihood (exponential) 
and sigmoid formulations have been proposed among others as candidate functions for confidence 
transformation [04]. Essentially, this process ensures that the outputs of the individual classifiers are 
consistent and compatible with each other and with the combination rule. 
When using classifiers of Type-II, i.e., classification outputs that include a ranked list of preferences to 
the available classes, simple counts in the form of a confusion matrix are not possible. Instead, the 
ranked lists have to be converted into a simple metric that defines the overall “preferability” of each 
class, according to multiple classification outputs. In other words, instead of counting the number of 
times each class is selected as the best candidate in a simple class prediction (Type-I), a measure of 
“desirability” is calculated by assigning desirability points or “ranks” in every sorted list of 
preferences and then summing them for each class separately. This scheme is known as the Borda 
count method of combining ranked lists of predictions, i.e., the outputs of Type-II classifiers. Usually, 
the Borda count is calculated using ranks equivalent to the position of each class index in a sorted list, 
which means that in a N-class problem the first rank position receives N-1 points, the second receives 
N-2 points and the last position receives 0. It is possible to allow a weighted scheme when assigning 
these ranking points, so that the distribution is not uniform but arbitrary. In this case, the scheme is 
called weighted Borda count or wBorda. 
The Borda and the more generic wBorda count methods are based on the presumption that the class 
selection at the rank position (i+1) is the second most probable candidate when classifying at class 
selection of rank (i). However, due to the absence of explicit probability estimations, it is not possible 
to directly extract “closure” measurements between these two choices. The weights in such a 
combination scheme can be designed in a way that produces this closure measurement in an 
optimized way.  
One obvious question is whether ranked list combination produces better results that simple majority 
selections. Indeed, in many cases the simple class selection rule and the corresponding majority 
selection for the final output produces different results than the one produced by Borda count [05]. 
However, in the case of weighted Borda count, if weights are assigned in a specific way that is 
consistent with a required criterion, i.e., the majority rule, then the same combination result can be 
achieved. In the case of the majority rule, the weights that need to be assigned are w=1 for the first 
rank position and w=0 for the rest of the ranks. In general, a weighting scheme can be applied in the 
rank positions in a way that satisfies all the requirements needed by the typical combination rules, like 
the sum rule and its specialized versions (min, max, median average, majority, trimmed means, 
spread combiner). The product rule can also be applied in the same way [05]. 
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It has been proposed that the weights of the rank items can be variable and proportional to the 
measured properties of each classifier performance. When probability estimations are available (Type-
III), like when using a neural network classifier, they can be used instead. In the more restricted case 
of simple class selections (Type-I), it has been suggested that the confusion matrix itself can be used as 
the basis for calculating ranked classifications, translating the a posteriori probabilities for each class 
into ranked list of preferences [05]. In this case, the first assumption is that the behavior of each 
classifier is known it is characterized by its confusion matrix, and second that this prior behavior is 
representative of its future behavior. The second assumption is also applied for Type-II or Type-III 
classifiers, i.e., even when the confusion matrix is of no importance and its validity is increased 
proportionally with the size of the datasets on which the classifiers are tested. 
But why restrict the classifier combination scheme into a Type-II, i.e., ranked classifications? It is true 
that the lack of explicit probability estimation from the classifier itself produces an inherent lack of 
information about the classification itself. However, many widely used classification models, 
including Support Vector Machines (SVM), are inherently designed to produce simple class selections 
as output. Furthermore, the use of simple class selections or ranked lists is required when a specific 
weighting profile has to be applied uniformly throughout an entire “committee” of experts, like in 
voting schemes. In other words, experts are weighted according to their competence in an adaptive 
way, but the calculation of these weights is not a subject each classifier’s own performance. Instead, 
these weights are the realization of a collective decision rule, like in a wBorda scheme. This issue and 
its implications will be discussed later on under the scope on weighted majority rules (WMR). 
 
1.3  Cascaded versus joint parameter optimization in combination schemes 
There are three general groups of combination rules that can be applied when creating a mixture of 
experts: (i) the fixed rules, (ii) the trained rules, and (iii) weighted combinations of confidence 
transformation. The fixed rules group contains all the typical rules discussed thus far, including the 
product rule, the sum rule and its specialized version, etc. Trained rules refer to the case of meta-
classifier nodes, where an arbitrary expert is trained experimentally upon the best way to combine the 
outputs of K experts against a given training dataset. Finally, the third group refers to models that are 
based on weighted order statistics, where a weight is assigned for each rank of confidence measure, 
rather than each classifier as in the case of weighted combination of classifier outputs. An example of 
this third group of combination rules is the Borda and, more specifically, the wBorda count models.  
As mentioned earlier, the parameters of the combination rule itself, i.e., the weights in a weighted 
average or in a wBorda count, are a subject of optimization against a specific criterion, normally the 
minimum classification error (MCE). Similarly, for trained rules, the meta-classifier is trained 
according to the same optimality criterion. Since this combined classification process can be realized 
as either two separate stages in a cascaded model or a unified modular architecture, the optimization 
process can address each stage separately or jointly together. The latter case is often used for trained 
rules, as the meta-classifier rule can be trained jointly together with the K classifiers of the first stage. 
For linear trained rules, the optimal weights correspond to the relative confidence attributed to each 
classifier, as in the fixed rules. However, an optimization process determines the best weighting 
profile based on a specific training dataset, instead of using a pre-defined weighting profile as the 
fixed rules suggest. For rules based on typical linear discriminant functions, the optimization process 
can be realized as parameter estimation via regression or by applying any other formulation of typical 
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linear classifier model. In the case of rules based on weighted order statistics, like the wBorda count, the 
most commonly used method is also regression or some other linear optimization approach. 
It is worth noticing that, as mentioned in the previous section, there is an inherent relationship 
between applying a weighting profile to the classifiers themselves and applying a weighting profile to 
the rank items that they produce as output. Classifiers with high accuracy rates, i.e., a high confidence 
value and a proportionally high weighting factor, will produce rank classifications where the first 
(top) item, i.e., the one with the largest rank weight, is usually correct. This evident correlation will be 
explained more clearly later on, within the context of “winning coalitions” and their realization in 
weighted majority games (WMG). 
While joint optimization of parameters should be able to provide more generic solutions, it is not yet 
clear if the joint approach produces better results than the cascaded scheme. In fact, recent studies 
have shown that the joint optimization does not improve the combination accuracy of the validation 
data as compared to the two-stage strategy [04]. In most cases, a simple weighted averaging rule upon 
trained classifiers produces the best results, even in problems of high complexity. This is attributed to 
the fact that, regardless of the complexity of the initial input space, the classifiers transform it to a 
highly restricted subspace with dimensionality equal to the number of classes available. Therefore, it 
is evident why optimized linear solutions, like the WMR model, may be the answer to this problem, 
especially when robust classifiers like SVM are considered. 
 
1.4  Elements of Game Theory 
In principle, the mathematical theory of games and gaming was first developed as a model for 
situations of conflict. Since the early 1940’s, the work of John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern 
has provided a solid foundation for the most simple types of games, as well as analytical forms for 
their solutions, with many applications to Economics, Operations Research and Logistics. The “zero-
sum” games are able to model situations of conflict between two or more “players”, where one’s gain 
is the other’s loss and vice versa. Furthermore, if all players are full informed about their opponents’ 
decisions the game is called of “perfect information”. Such games are all board games like chess and it 
has been proven that there is at least one optimal plan of decisions or “strategy” for each player, as 
well as a “solution” to the game that comes naturally as a result of all players following their optimal 
strategies. At the game’s solution, each player can guarantee that the maximum gain an opponent can 
gain is kept under a specific minimal limit, defined only by this player’s own strategy. Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern proved this assertion as a theorem called “Minimax” and in the simple case of two 
opposing players the solution of the game can be calculated analytically as a solution of a 2x2 set of 
linear equations. The consequences of the Minimax theorem have been thoroughly studied for many 
years after its proof. As an example, it mathematically proves the assertion that all board games, 
including the most complex ones like chess, have at least one solution, optimal for both players that 
can be analytically calculated, at least in theory. 
Although the Minimax theorem provided a solid base for solving many types of games, it is only 
applicable in practice for the zero-sum type of games. In reality, it is common that in a conflict not all 
players receive their opponents’ looses as their own gain and vice versa. In other words, it is very 
common a specific combination of decisions between the players to result in a certain amount of 
“loss” to one and a corresponding “gain”, not of equal magnitude, to another. In this case, the game is 
called “nonzero-sum” and it requires a new set of rules for estimating optimal strategies and 
solutions. As each player’s gains and losses are not directly related to the opponents’, the optimal 
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solution is only based on the assertion that it should be the one that ensures that the player has “no 
regrets” when choosing between possible decision options. This essentially means that, since each 
player is now interested in his/her own gains and losses, the optimal solution should focus on 
maximizing each player’s own “expectations” [11]. The Minimax property can still be applied in 
principle when the single most “secure” option must be identified, but the solution of the game has 
now a new meaning. 
During the early 1950’s, John Nash has focused primarily on the problem of finding a set of 
“equilibrium points” in nonzero-sum games, where the players eventually settle after a series of 
competitive rounds of the game. In strict mathematical terms, these equilibrium points would not the 
same in essence with the Minimax solutions, as they would come as a result of the players’ 
competitive behavior and not as an algebraic solution of the games’ mathematical formulation. In 1957 
Nash has successfully proved that indeed such equilibrium points exist in all nonzero-sum games*, in 
a way that is analogous to the Minimax theorem assertion. However, although the Nash theorem 
ensures that at least one such “Nash equilibrium” exists in all nonzero-sum games, there is no clear 
indication on how the game’s solution can be analytically calculated at this point. In other words, 
although a solution is known to exist, there is no closed form for nonzero-sum games until today. 
It should be noted that players participating in a nonzero-sum game may or may not have the same 
options available as alternative course of action, or the same set of options may lead to different 
payoffs between the players. When players are fully exchangeable and their ordering in the game 
makes not difference to the game setup and its solutions, the game is called “symmetrical”. Otherwise, 
if exchanging players’ position does not yield a proportional exchange in their payoffs, then the game 
is called “asymmetrical”. Naturally, symmetrical games lead to Nash equilibrium points that appear 
in pairs, as an exchange between players creates its symmetrical counterpart. 
But the Nash equilibrium points are not always the globally optimal option for the players. In fact, the 
Nash equilibrium is optimal only when players are strictly competitive, i.e., when there is no chance 
for a mutually agreed solution that benefits them more. These strictly competitive forms of games are 
called “non-cooperative games”. The alternative option, the one that allows communication and prior 
arrangements between the players, is called a “cooperative game” and it is generally a much more 
complicated form of nonzero-sum gaming. Naturally, there is no option of having cooperative zero-
sum games, since the game structure itself prohibits any other settlement between the players other 
than the Minimax solution. 
The problem of cooperative or possibly cooperative gaming is the most common form of conflict in 
real life situations. Since nonzero-sum games have at least one equilibrium point when studied under 
the strictly competitive form, Nash has extensively studied the cooperative option as an extension to 
it. However, the possibility of finding and mutually adopting a solution that is better for both players 
than the one suggested by the Nash equilibrium, essentially involves a set of behavioral rules 
regarding the players’ stance and “mental” state, rather than strict optimality procedures [11]. Nash 
named this process as “bargain” between the players, trying to mutually agree on one solution 
between multiple candidates within a “bargaining set”. In practice, each player should enter a 
bargaining procedure if there is a chance that a cooperative solution exists and it provides at least the 
                                               
* Seminal works by C. Daskalakis & Ch. Papadimitriou in 2006-2007 and on have proved that, while Nash 
equilibria exist, they may be unattainable and/or practically impossible to calculate due to the inherent 
algorithmic complexity of this problem; see e.g. “The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium”, 38th ACM 
Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2006. 
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same gain as the best strictly competitive solution, i.e., the best Nash equilibrium. In this case, if such a 
solution is agreed between the players, it is called “bargaining solution” of the game. 
As mentioned earlier, each player acts upon the property of no regrets, i.e., follow the decisions that 
maximize their own expectations. Nevertheless, the game setup itself provides means of improving 
the final gain in an agreed solution. In some cases, the bargaining process may involve the option of 
“threats”, that is a player may express the intention to follow a strategy that is particularly costly for 
the opponent. Of course, the opponent can do the same, focusing on a similar “threat”. This procedure 
is still a cooperative bargaining process, with the threshold of expectations raised for both players. The 
result of such a process may be a mutually “deterring” solution, which in this case is called a 
“threating solution”. Nash has formulated all these bargaining situations into a set of relatively logical 
axioms, under which a solution (equilibrium) exists. As in the general case of non-cooperative games, 
Nash’s “bargaining theorem” does not provide analytical means of finding such solutions. 
The notion of “bargaining sets” and “threat equilibrium” is often extended in special forms of games 
that include iterative or recursive steps in gaming, either in the form of multi-step analysis 
(metagames) or focusing on the transitional aspects of the game (differential games). Modern research 
is focused on methods that introduce probabilistic models into games of multiple realizations and/or 
multiple stages [11]. 
 
1.5  Coalitions, Stable Sets and Indices of Power 
Nash’s work on the “Nash equilibrium” and “bargaining theorem” provides the necessary means to 
study n-person non-cooperative and cooperative games under a unifying point of view. Specifically, a 
nonzero-sum game can be realized as a strictly competitive or a possibly cooperative form, according 
to the game’s rules and restrictions. Therefore, the cooperative option can be viewed as a 
generalization to the strictly competitive mode of gaming. 
When players are allowed to cooperate in order to agree on a mutually beneficial solution of game, 
they essentially choose one strategy over the others and bargain this option with all the others in order 
to come to an agreement. For symmetrical games, this is like each player chooses to join a group of 
other players with similar preference over their initial choice. Each of these groups is called a 
“coalition” and it constitutes the basic module in this new type of gaming: the members of each 
coalition act as cooperative players joined together and at the same time each coalition competes over 
the others in order to impose its own position and become the “winning coalition”. This setup is very 
common when modeling voting schemes, where the group that captures the relative majority of the 
votes becomes the winner. 
Coalition Theory is closely related to the classical Game Theory, especially the cooperating gaming 
[11]. In essence, each player still tries to maximize its own expectations, not individually any more but 
instead as part of a greater opposing term. Therefore, the individual gains and capabilities of each 
player is now considered in close relation to the coalition this player belongs, as well as how its 
individual decision to join or leave a coalition affects this coalition’s winning position. As in classic 
nonzero-sum games, the notion of equilibrium points and solutions is considered under the scope of 
dominating or not in the game at hand. Furthermore, the theoretical implications of having competing 
coalitions of cooperative players is purely combinatorial in nature, thus making its analysis very 
complex and cumbersome. There are also special cases of collective decision schemes where a single 
player is allowed to “abstain” completely from the voting procedure, or prohibit a contrary outcome 
of the group via a “veto” option. 
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In order to study the properties of a single player participating in a game of coalitions, it is necessary 
to analyze the wining conditions of each coalition. Usually each player is assigned a fixed value of 
“importance” or “weight” when participating in this type of games and each coalition’s power is 
measured as a sum over the individual weights of all players participating in this coalition. The 
coalition that ends up with the highest value of power is the winning coalition. Therefore, it is clear 
that, while each player’s power is related to its individual weight, this relation is not directly mapped 
on how the participation in any arbitrary coalition may affect this coalition winning position. As this 
process stands true for all possible coalitions that can be formed, this competitive type of “claiming” 
over the available players by each coalition suggests that there are indeed configurations that 
marginally favor the one or the other coalition, i.e., a set of “solutions”. The notion of solution in 
coalition games is somewhat different from the one suggested for typical nonzero-sum games, as it 
identifies minimal settings for coalitions that dominate all the others. In other words, they do not 
identify points of maximal gain for a player or even a coalition, but equilibrium points that determine 
which of the forming coalitions is the winning one. This type of “solutions” in coalition games is 
defined in close relation to “domination” and “stability” of such points and they are often referred to 
as “the Core”. Von Neumann and Morgenstern have defined a somewhat more relaxed definition of 
such conditions and the corresponding solutions are called “stable sets” [11]. It should be noted that, 
in contrast to Nash’s theorems and the Minimax assertion of solutions, there is generally no guarantee 
that solutions in the context of the Core and stable sets need to exist in an arbitrary coalition game. 
The notion of the Core and stable sets in coalition gaming is of vital importance when trying to 
identify the winning conditions and the relative power of each individual player in affecting the 
outcome of the game. The observation that a player’s weight in a weighted system may not intuitively 
correspond to its voting “power” goes back at least to Shapley and Shubik (1954). For example, a 
specific weight distribution to the players may make them relatively equivalent in terms of voting 
power or, while only a slight variation of the weights may render some of them completely irrelevant 
on determining the winning coalition [06]. Shapley and Shubik (1954) and later Banzhaf and Coleman 
(1965, 1971) suggested a set of well-defined equations for calculating the relative power of each player, 
as well as each forming coalitions as a whole [11]. The “Shapley index of power” is based on the 
calculation of the actual contribution of each player entering a coalition, in terms of improving the 
coalition’s gain and winning position. Similarly, the “Banzhaf index of power” calculates how an 
individual player’s decision to join or leave a coalition results in a winning or loosing position for this 
coalition, accordingly. Both indexes are basically means of translating each player’s individual 
importance or weight within the coalition game into a quantitative measure of power in terms of 
determining the winner. While both indices include combinatorial realizations, the Banzhaf index is 
usually easier to calculate, as it is based on the sum of “shifts” on the winning condition a player can 
incur [07]. Furthermore, its importance in coalition games will be made clearer later on, where the 
Banzhaf index will come as a direct result when calculating the derivatives of a weighted majority 
game. 
 
1.6  Collective competence and the Condorcet criterion 
The transformation of cooperative n-person games into coalition games essentially brings the general 
problem closer to a voting scheme. Each player casts a vote related to its own choice or strategy, thus 
constituting him/her as a member of a coalition of players with similar choices. The coalition that 
gains more votes becomes the winner. 
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Condorcet (1785) was the first to address the problem of how to design and evaluate an efficient 
voting system, in terms of fairness among the people that participating in the voting process, as well 
as the optimal outcome for the winner(s). This first attempt to create a probabilistic model of a voting 
body is known today as the “Condorcet Jury Theorem”. In essence, this theorem says that if each of 
the voting individuals is somewhat more likely than not to make the “better” choice between some 
pair of alternative options, and if each individual makes its own choice independently from all the 
others, then the probability that the group majority is “correct” is greater than the individual 
probabilities of the voters. Moreover, this probability of correct choice by the group increases as the 
number of independent voters increases [07]. In practice, this means that if each voter decides 
independently and performs marginally higher than 50%, then a group of such voters is guaranteed to 
perform better than each of the participating individuals. This assertion has been used in Social 
sciences for decades as a proof that decentralized decision making, like in a group of juries in a court, 
performs better than centralized expertise, i.e., a sole judge. 
The Condorcet Jury Theorem and its implications have been used as one guideline for estimating the 
efficiency of any voting system and decision making in general. The study of effects like diversely 
informed voters or situations of conflicting interests have provided several aspects of possible 
applications in social and economical models. In the context of collective decision-making via voting 
schemes, the theorem provides a mean to test the “fairness” and effectiveness of such a system, as it 
usually constitutes the outcome that yields the best possible degree of consensus among the voting 
participants. Specifically, the interest is focused on how aggregate competence of the whole voting 
group, measured by the probability of making a correct collective decision, depends on the defining 
properties of the decision-making process itself, such as different coalition sizes, team setups and 
possible overlapping memberships. Under this context, the coalition games are studied by applying 
quantitative measures on “collective competence” and optimal distribution of power, e.g. tools like 
the Banzhaf or Shapley indices of power. The degree of consistency of such a voting scheme on 
establishing the pair-wise winner(s), as the Condorcet Jury Theorem indicates, is often referred to as 
the “Condorcet criterion”. This criterion is not the only possible measure of collective competence in a 
voting scheme, but as it will be explained in the next section, it is very generic and it is directly linked 
to optimal wBorda models. 
 
1.7  Optimal scoring rules and Condorcet efficiency 
Let us consider a typical voting situation where an n-person voting group is required to cast their 
votes regarding a set of M classes, not as simple class selections but rather in the more general sense of 
ranking all the available options in a list of strict preference by each of the voters. Clearly there is a 
fixed set of possible ranking permutations and each voter essentially chooses one of them as his/her 
vote. The problem is to decide upon the exact combination procedure for these votes, in order to 
produce a result that exhibits the highest possible degree of consensus between the voters, not only in 
the first place as in simple majority rules, but throughout the final sorted list. One of the more widely 
accepted criteria for choosing the exact permutation that best reflects the cumulative will of the voting 
group is the Condorcet criterion [07]. As it is based exclusively on pair-wise comparisons between the 
voting options, i.e., every possible pair of subsequent classes in a sorted list, a system that exhibits a 
high degree of consistency with the Condorcet criterion should provide an aggregate ranking result 
that represents the best consensus solution. The degree in which such a voting scheme maximizes the 
consistency with the Condorcet criterion is often called “Condorcet efficiency” of the system. 
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It is clear that voting systems as the one described above fit the specifications of a wBorda scheme, as 
an optimized wBorda should also be able to produce an aggregate ranking consistent with the 
cumulative will of the complete voting group. Therefore, the next obvious question is whether there is 
a way to design such a wBorda voting scheme that maximizes the Condorcet criterion. The direct 
answer is that this problem is classified as NP-complete by nature, which means that due to its 
combinatorial nature it is not possible to be solved with algorithms of polynomial complexity. In fact, 
this is the reason why simple realizations of the weighting profile or even a simple majority rule is 
often applied in practice, in order to keep such a system simple and widely accepted by the voting 
group [06].  
Using the notion of Condorcet efficiency of a voting system, the real problem can be focused on the 
exact scoring rules, often called “weighted scoring rules”, than must be applied on each rank of the 
vote, in order to produce a result that maximizes this criterion. Two scoring systems are particularly 
worth noting in this context: the plurality voting, where only the top-position rank is awarded with 
one point (w=1) and all the other positions with nothing (w=0), and the classic Borda count, where the 
top-position rank receives maximum points (w=1), the bottom-position rank the minimum (w=0) and 
all intermediate positions a value proportional to the exact rank [08]. 
Under the scope of weighted scoring rules and the more general theory of weighted order statistics, it 
has been proven theoretically that for three classes and n-person voting group, the scheme that 
maximizes the probability that any pair-wise contest in the final ranked list will be consistent with the 
pairwise majority rule, is in fact the Borda count model. This means that if the system should sort the 
list of winners in a way that is consistent with the pairwise majority rule, then the Borda count scheme 
can accomplish this. Similarly, if the majority criterion is instead replaced with the more generic 
Condorcet criterion, a specific wBorda model with non-uniform weighting profile is the optimal 
solution in this case [08]. This diversity between the two optimized scoring rules comes from the fact 
that the Condorcet criterion suggests a stricter rule of optimality than the simple majority and this is 
why the existence of a Condorcet winner is not always guaranteed [05]. In [08], a geometrical 
realization of the wBorda design process has been suggested and results have shown that for three 
candidate classes the middle-position rank has to be assigned with a weight value of less than zero, 
i.e., different than the classic Borda rule, in order to obtain maximum Condorcet efficiency. Current 
theoretical results are not sufficient to support any generic statement regarding the design properties 
of such optimal schemes. Furthermore, the high degree of complexity prohibits the analytical 
theoretical study of such systems, in order to produce generic constructive methods for wBorda of 
maximum Condorcet efficiency. 
 
1.8  Majority functions and Banzhaf numbers 
Let us now focus in the case of dichotomous choice situations where there are only two candidate 
classes to vote for. This is clearly a simpler problem in terms of pattern recognition, since an input has 
to be classified in either one of the two available choices, “true” or “false”, “positive” or “negative”, 
“benign” or “malignant”. As there are only two available class choices, the Borda count, which is used 
when class rankings are considered, reduces to the simple class selection scheme and the resulting 
majority rule that is used in practice. 
Dichotomy choice situations have been the center of many analytical probabilistic studies within the 
scope of voting systems, primarily because of the simplicity of the probabilistic formulations of such 
models. A dichotomy choice can be easily modeled as a binomial distribution and the combined result 
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in a n-player voting game becomes a product of the corresponding “skill” probabilities of the 
individual players. Then, a combined decision rule can be formulated according to the aggregate 
choice that is supported by the largest combined probability, i.e., the choice that corresponds to the 
maximum degree of consensus among the players. These decision rules are called “majority 
functions” and in the special case where all players and classes are accompanied with the same 
weight, the simple majority rule emerges as a natural result. 
In terms of coalition games, the simple majority functions are modeled in a way which is much more 
trivial than the generic wBorda scheme that was presented in previously. Again, if special voting 
situations like abstains and veto are not allowed, the choice of either one of the two available classes 
automatically assigns every participating player into one of the two possible coalitions. Classes may or 
may not be weighted with the same “value” or “importance”, while the players themselves may be 
accompanied with a weight or “reliability” value too. In any case, if a linear rule is applied to 
accumulate and combine all individual choices in order to make a final collective estimation, a 
weighted majority rule emerges. The threshold of the majority decision may also be altered in a way 
that requires not only relative majority, but a majority value higher than a specific decision threshold. 
In practice, this means that a bias may be used in the weighted majority function in order to ensure 
that the final majority outcome is valid only if it attains a specific confidence level. 
The analysis of the majority functions is often restricted to the non-weighted case, as they are much 
easier to analyze within the scope of classic probabilistic theory. In fact, this special case of majority 
functions can be easily related to the Banzhaf power index [07]. Specifically, if the collective efficiency 
is to be calculated as a function of the individual “skill” probabilities of the players, the partial 
derivatives of the majority functions against these probabilities are calculated. These derivatives 
essentially estimate the number of “shifts” that a player with a specific skill probability can cause in 
the winning position of any winning coalition, i.e., it is exactly what the Banzhaf power index stands 
for. This assertion can be extended for the weighted majority functions as well, in a slightly more 
complex probabilistic form. Based in this very important conclusion, it is possible to translate many of 
the properties of coalition games into properties that are directly linked with each player’s skill. 
The first and extremely important conclusion from studying the Banzhaf numbers as the derivatives 
of a majority function is the fact that the maximum of these derivatives should point to the 
configuration where maximum Banzhaf power occurs for all the voting players. Indeed, it can be 
easily proven that maximum Banzhaf values correspond to individual skill probabilities close to 0.5 
for all voting players. That is, the vote of each voting member reaches its maximum “value” when all 
players have the same average skill for making correct estimations. Interestingly enough, that is 
exactly what the Condorcet Jury Theorem suggests in a more generic way. An electorate system with 
high Banzhaf number corresponds to a high level of collective competence, which in turn is obtained 
for a high level of “democracy” in the sense of an equitable distribution of decisional power among 
the voters [07]. As high Banzhaf numbers indicate a high degree of democracy among the voting 
members, the decentralized option for making collective decisions is, again, asserted as the optimal 
way – this time in a more strict mathematical statement. This is perhaps a sufficient justification for 
using ensembles of independent experts with only moderate efficiency, rather than one single expert 
of the very high efficiency. 
But what about the distribution of power within the voting group itself? Using the same formulation 
of Banzhaf numbers as derivatives of the corresponding majority functions, Berg [07] and Taylor and 
Zwicker [06] have stated some very interesting results regarding the optimal structure and 
distribution of voting power of such a system. Specifically, it has been proven that in any non-
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weighted majority function, the sub-division of the players into teams that subsequently take part in a 
second-stage indirect voting scheme results in a loss of individual decisional power, in terms of how a 
single player can affect the final result with his/her vote [07]. This essentially means that it is better to 
have KxN voters in one voting group than to split them into K teams of N/K members each for voting 
via K representatives. Boland (1989) has proved that although the Condorcet Jury Theorem also stands 
true for indirect voting systems, splitting a voting group into teams essentially lowers the majority 
threshold necessary for a coalition to become a winning one, thus reducing the probability for a 
collectively correct decision [07]. This implies that for the same overall voting group size and 
individual skill probabilities p>0.5, an indirect voting scheme always has less reliability than a 
corresponding direct system, which in turn favors combination methods with the least possible 
integration stages. This effect is more evident for systems that employ a relatively large number of 
voters, rather than small-sized systems where this difference is expected to be minimal [07]. 
In terms of team sizes versus number of teams, Boland (1989) has also proved that in an indirect 
system, a large number of small teams are collectively more effective than a small number of large 
teams. In the extreme case where each team includes only one voter, the indirect system becomes 
direct, i.e., with no representatives, which is the strictly more efficient voting structure as noted 
earlier. Special studies have been carried out for situations of teams with unequal number of members 
or for overlapping memberships. Again, as in the case of single voting players, it has been proven that 
the collectively more efficient choice is splitting the voters into teams of equal size and distinct 
memberships, i.e., in way that favors equal distribution of voting power in every case [07]. 
The overlapping membership case can be viewed as a situation where some of the players are allowed 
to participate in more than one representative team, in other words to affect the final outcome with 
more than one votes. This is essentially equivalent to having an increased reliability or weight 
assigned to these players. As mentioned earlier, the weighted majority functions are a generalized 
version of the ones that have been studied within this scope. As it turns out, the collective decision 
efficiency may benefit from such an overlapping membership, i.e., a weighted voting scheme, only 
when the players with multiple votes exhibit a skill probability higher than a specific threshold. This 
higher than the average skill level P of the rest of the voting players threshold and it depends on this 
average skill level P and the total number of N voters, but not on the number of K teams [07]. This 
conclusion favors the application of weighted versus non-weighted majority functions in theory, but it 
does not specify an optimal way to find out which players to favor, in other words how to calculate 
these weights. This issue will be addressed later on within the context of weighted majority games 
(WMG). Generally speaking, analyses in terms of voting games and distribution of power are not 
common in the literature on the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), as well as 
Berg [07], stress the importance of a game-theoretic approach to collective decision making. 
 
1.9  Weighted Majority Games and Weighted Majority Rules 
In most cases, majority functions that are employed in practice very simplistic when it comes to 
weighting distribution profile or they imply a completely uniform weight distribution. However, a 
specific weighting profile usually produces better results, provided that is simple enough to be 
applied in practice and attain a consensus in accepting it as “fair” by the voters. Taylor and Zwicker 
(1991) have defined a voting system as “trade robust” if an arbitrary series of trades among several 
winning coalitions can never simultaneously render them losing [06]. Furthermore, they prove that a 
voting system is trade robust if and only if it is weighted. This means that, if appropriate weights are 
applied, at least one winning coalition can benefit from this procedure. 
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As an example, institutional policies usually apply a non-uniform voting scheme when it comes to 
collective board decisions. This is often referred to as the “inner cabinet rule”. In a hospital, senior 
staff members may attain increased voting power or the chairman may hold the right of a tie-breaking 
vote. It has been proven both in theory and in practice that such schemes are more efficient than 
simple majority rules or any restricted versions of them like trimmed means. 
Nitzan and Paroush (1982) have studied the problem of optimal weighted majority rules (WMR) 
extensively and they have proved that they are indeed the optimal decision rules for a group of 
decision makers in dichotomous choice situations [09]. This proof was later (2001) extended by Ben-
Yashar and Paroush, from dichotomous to polychotomous choice situations [13]; hence, the optimality 
of the WMR formulation has been proven theoretically for any n-label voting task. 
A WMR is in fact a realization of a weighted majority game (WMG), where a group of players with 
arbitrary skill levels form coalitions of similar interests but different estimations. The WMGs are a 
well-known subgroup of coalition games where there are only two possible coalitions, each related to 
one of the two class options available. In this form of gaming, there is no need of class ranking 
schemes as in wBorda, thus the classification problem reduces to the optimal design of a combination 
rule between two extreme options. These optimal combination rules are similarly called WMR and the 
proof that they are linear in nature limits the problem to the estimation of an optimal (non-negative) 
weighting profile for the voters. 
The weight optimization procedure has been applied experimentally in trained or other types of 
combination rules, but analytical solutions for the weights is not commonly used. However, Shapley 
and Grofman (1984) have established that an analytical solution for the weighting profile exists and it 
is indeed related to the individual player competencies or skill levels [09]. Specifically, if decision 
independency is assumed for the participating players, the optimal weights in a WMR scheme can be 
calculated as the log-odds of their respective skill probabilities, i.e., Wi=log(Oi)=log(Pi/(1-Pi)). 
Interestingly enough, this is exactly the solution found by analytical Bayesian-based approaches in the 
context of decision fusion of independent experts [12]. The optimality assertion regarding the WMR, 
together with an analytical solution for the optimal weighting profile, provides an extremely powerful 
tool for designing theoretically optimal collective decision rules. Usually, the winning coalition in a 
WMR is the one that accumulates the relative weighted majority, which is more than half the sum of 
weights. If a bias is also applied as a confidence threshold, then the simple weighted majority rule 
becomes the “cogent” weighted majority rule. In this case, a region of “stalemate” or “no-decision” is 
created and the existence of a winning coalition in a WMR is not guaranteed. 
There is an equivalence relation on the WMRs, whereby two WMRs are equivalent if they produce the 
same decision function, i.e., the same outcome for each decision profile produced by the participating 
players. Therefore, from all the possible realizations of a WMR of a given dimension, it is possible to 
identify a closed set of unique WMRs that are able to produce all the possible combination outcomes 
with a normalized version of the weights [09]. As an example of such closed set of solutions, the 
unique WMRs for n=4 voting players are: S1={1,0,0,0}, S2={2,1,1,1} and S3={1,1,1,0}. The S1 and S3 
solutions clearly implement the restricted majority rules with odd number of voters, while S2 
implements a simple majority rule with a tie-breaking option for one of the players. It can be proven 
that all other realizations of 4-player WMRs can be mapped into one of these three unique WMRs. 
The calculation of such a set of WMRs is cumbersome and it is generally an NP-complete problem. 
However, there have been analytical studies for WMRs of dimension up to seven players. For 
example, in the set of all 84 WMGs between five players, only 7 of them are not transformations of 
others. Von Neuman and Morgenstern (1944) identified the 21 unique WMGs for six players, while 
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Isbel (1959) and Fishburn and Gehrlien (1977) identified the 135 unique WMGs for seven players. 
Karotkin (1994) coded a special algorithm to identify the WMRs or the WMGs for any group size and 
proposed a graph-based method for illustrating the decision-based “closeness” of such WMRs in a 
three-dimensional space, called the “network of WMR” [09]. Using directed edges, the network of 
WMR can identify the node that is optimal for a given set of players’ skill probabilities profile, i.e., the 
WMG solution that is in fact the one that the log-odds calculates for the corresponding weights. The 
practical use of such a graph-based representation of WMRs is that it can suggest optimal 
substitutions of the theoretically optimal WMR with best sub-optimal simplified realization [10]. This 
is extremely important in real life problems where simple collective decision rules with 
straightforward application are needed. 
 
1.10  Weighted Majority Rules and Condorcet efficiency 
The efficiency of a WMR is defined as the likelihood that it will resolve in the correct choice, given the 
skill probabilities of the participating voters. These likelihood functions are quite difficult to calculate 
in practice due to the fact that the number of possible decision profiles is a combinatorial enumeration 
problem. As a result, it is also difficult to compare relative efficiencies between different WMRs. 
However, since a WMR is proved to be the optimal structure in the sense of collective decision 
competence, the corresponding weighting profile that is optimal for a given set of skill probabilities of 
the participating voters should be the actual realization of the theoretically most efficient voting 
scheme. 
As mentioned earlier, in the case of multiple class options where class rankings are necessary, it is 
possible to find a wBorda scheme that maximizes the Condorcet efficiency of such a voting system, 
although this problem is generally NP-complete. When this setup is reduced into the dichotomous 
choice situation where there are only two classes available, this model becomes the theoretically 
optimal formulation of the WMRs. However, in this case there is an analytical solution for the optimal 
weighting profile that is not NP-complete, although the complete enumeration of all the unique 
WMRs that can be implemented in practice is of that complexity. As a result, the next question is at 
what degree a WMR can be viewed as an optimal solution to a WMG in the Condorcet sense. 
To answer this question, the notion of “bias” or “confidence threshold” in a WMR has to be reviewed 
under a new perspective. In wBorda schemes, each class ranking position is scored with a specific 
weight and the corresponding scoring rule is considered optimal in the Condorcet sense if it 
maximizes the Condorcet criterion. Similarly, in the case of two class problem, the simple choice 
between the one or the other choice essentially implies a similar preference ranking regarding the 
classes. Therefore, both the first (proposed) class choice and the second (rejected) class choice can be 
assigned with a scoring value, i.e., a weight, that can be incorporated into the standard WMR 
formulation. These scoring values are not a subject of the players’ skill probabilities, since the 
efficiency of each player affects only the corresponding weight it receives within the WMR function, 
not the scoring result of selecting or rejecting a class. In a sense, the scoring of class selection or 
rejection adds a weighting scheme in the second dimension of the WMRs, that of the classes. 
Using this new more generalized formulation of WMRs, it can be easily proven through linear 
transformations that this class scoring essentially produces a “positive” or “negative” bias to the 
accumulated result of the standard WMR. Therefore, a decision threshold can be shifted towards the 
one or the other class accordingly, based not only on which exactly of the players selected it but also 
the mere (weighted) count of the times it was proposed or rejected by all the players. If all players’ 
Harris V. Georgiou (harris@xgeorgio.info)  –  “Collective decision efficiency and optimal voting mechanisms…” 
Pg. 16 of 21 
votes are weighted exactly the same, then this new scheme is a two-class realization of a wBorda count 
model. But the wBorda model has been already proven as adequate for providing an optimal voting 
realization in the Condorcet sense. In fact, adding a bias to both classes according to their selection 
count is mathematically equivalent to setting the WMR decision threshold at a value other than half 
the sum of the weights, i.e., “biased” towards one of the classes. Not surprisingly, this new 
generalized version of the WMR can also be considered adequate for implementing voting schemes 
that maximize the Condorcet criterion, i.e., the exhaustive pair-wise ranking contest between the 
coalitions. 
The assertion that WMRs are optimal realization of combinations schemes in dichotomy choice 
situations has some extremely significant implications in the way the WMRs can be used as a unified 
template model for creating optimal collective decision systems. These linear formulations of WMGs 
are optimal in the MCE sense but additionally they can be designed to be optimal in the Condorcet 
sense. Dichotomy choice situations are simple enough so that a Condorcet winner, that is the overall 
top-ranked class, is also the majority winner, which is simple the class that received the most votes. If 
weights are applied to the players, then the simple majority rule becomes a weighted one. If scores are 
also applied in the “support” or “reject” options (ranks) of the classifications, then a two-class wBorda 
count model can be realized in a way that maximizes the Condorcet criterion. In practice, this second 
case is equivalent to imposing a collective decision threshold other than half the sum of the weights. 
While the players’ optimal weighting profile in the WMR solves the problem of how to combine their 
individual decisions in an MCE-optimal way, the class scoring provides the means the design the 
voting system in a way that is also optimal in the Condorcet sense. The conditions under which these 
two properties can be satisfied simultaneously remains an open issue. 
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Part II – Applications to Pattern Recognition† 
 
2.1  Basic framework 
In part-I of this report it was suggested that classifiers providing “hard” decisions, or other types of 
classifiers with translated output to a set of distinct choices, can be used as the basis of a general 
combination procedure for providing a collective decision system. Furthermore, it was described how 
this model can be effectively fused into a game-theoretic approach of the combination problem that 
finally leads to coalition games and collective decision theory. This section describes how these 
models can be realized and implemented as practical systems within the scope of Pattern Recognition. 
In order to combine classifier outputs in an optimized way, first it is necessary to convert their 
posterior accuracy probabilities into quantitative measures of evidence regarding their past 
performance. For classifiers of “hard” decisions, the confusion matrix is a very descriptive and 
perhaps the most practical way to do this. Specifically, the confusion matrix itself can be translated 
into class rankings and conditional probabilities estimations, as it was suggested earlier. Furthermore, 
the use of the confusion matrix is completely compatible with any extension that introduces the notion 
of “risk” into the classification process. 
Decision-critical applications, like in medical diagnostics, require strict distinction between the various 
cases of correct and incorrect predictions. This means that a specific weight is assigned for every such 
classification case, in the form of a positive “gain” for correct predictions or a negative “loss” for 
misclassifications. When combined with the corresponding posteriori probabilities of the classifier, it 
is possible to calculate the expected statistical “risk”, i.e., the average gain or loss that this particular 
classifier can produce. If the classifier is trained from the start by applying optimization criteria based 
on risk factors, rather than simply the classification accuracy, then the process is a “risk-based” rather 
than “error-based” training of the classifier. Not all classifier architectures are fit to be implemented as 
risk-based models, primarily due to the fact that the introduction of risk factors within the feedback 
process of the training may result in severe instability and failure. However, the notion of risk 
embodies a much more generalized viewpoint of the classification problem and it is very important in 
real-world applications. 
Using risk-based models for the classifiers, the game-theoretic approach of collective decision systems 
becomes much more comprehensible. The efficiency of each participating “player” is now measured 
not simply in a sense of absolute accuracy but in the scope of average “gain” in each run of the game. 
Therefore, every combination scheme also embodies the same notion of maximizing the collective 
“gain” or, equivalently, minimizing the collective “loss”, by employing an optimal combination rule. 
This risk-based approach is also valid for a coalition’s winning stance against the others, as well as the 
expected payoff from the whole game, since a winning coalition’s gain coincides with the overall gain 
                                               
† Comments in this section are subject of own study and experimental verification, conducted during the author’s PhD work, 
2001-2008 and on. Almost all of the proposed items have been addressed, experimentally tested and subsequently published in 
various conference, journal and open-access papers. For detailed description of the theoretical and practical aspects of applying 
these ideas in the context of novel classifier combination architectures, see e.g. [14-16]: 
 “A Game-Theoretic Approach to Weighted Majority Voting for Combining SVM Classifiers”, Harris Georgiou, Michael 
Mavroforakis, Sergios Theodoridis. Int. Conf. on ANN (ICANN), 10-13 September 2006 @ Athens, Greece. Ref: S.Kollias et al. 
(Eds): ICANN 2006, Part I, LNCS 4131, pp. 284-292, 2006.  
 “A game-theoretic framework for classifier ensembles using weighted majority voting with local accuracy estimates”, H. 
Georgiou, M. Mavroforakis, arXiv.org preprint (en)(arXiv:1302.0540v1 [cs.LG]). 
 “Algorithms for Image Analysis and Combination of Pattern Classifiers with Application to Medical Diagnosis”, H. Georgiou,    
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of the collective decision rule. Therefore, the formulation of this type of gaming under the scope of 
WMGs and the corresponding WMRs comes very naturally. 
Since the WMR have been proven as the optimal combination rules in dichotomy choice situations, it 
is very interesting to examine the conditions under which these optimality assertions stand true for 
trained classifiers in the place of players. It is expected that, as these classifiers are more or less 
dependent with each other due to similar architectures or training datasets, the design of optimal 
WMRs for combining them can not be realized in completely closed form. Instead, the calculation of 
the exact weighting profile requires the exploitation of various statistical and structural properties of 
the feature space, as well as the correlation of input patterns and classes. Most ensemble techniques 
exploit these properties by enhancing classification regions of special interest, like points close to the 
decision boundary. This issue has been noted earlier within the scope of voting systems, specifically in 
relation to the diversity between the experts. In practice, many ensemble methods that employ 
maximization of diversity essentially increase the degree of independency between the participants. 
Since an increased level of independency provides the means for a collectively efficient decision, it is 
not surprising to see that the results from the Pattern Recognition viewpoint coincide with the ones 
inferenced by the game-theoretic approach, where Banzhaf and Shapley indices of power can be 
considered as measures of diversity among the participants. 
 
2.2  Adaptive realizations of WMRs  
As it was mentioned previously, assumptions of complete independency between the classes and their 
corresponding coalitions in WMGs, as well as between the experts are never completely true. Thus, it 
is necessary to enhance the combination process in a sense that takes into account these types of 
correlations. Tresp and Taniguchi (1996) have suggested that a combination scheme which uses a fixed 
or a weighted majority rule should exploit the properties of the statistical distributions of the classes at 
hand. Using a Gaussian approximation, they have shown how the efficiency of such a combination 
rule can be improved if the mean and variance of each class are used when calculating the parameters 
(weights) of the combination rule. However, the standard WMR approach for optimal combination of 
experts does not include such an adaptive scheme. Furthermore, the variance-based weighting 
method of Tresp and Taniguchi impose further assumptions and restrictions to the distributions of the 
classes, which can be non-Gaussian in general. 
Instead of employing a fixed statistical approximation for the complete class distribution, a new fully 
adaptive approach can be designed on a lower level. Specifically, since the distribution of each class, 
i.e., the topological couplings between the individual training samples of the class, affects the exact 
weighting profile of the classifiers that is optimal in some error-based or risk-based criterion, then a 
topological measure of “closure” between any arbitrary pair of samples should be used instead of the 
statistical approximation of their distribution. In other words, instead of checking how well an 
unclassified sample fits the statistical distribution of the one or the other class, it should be checked 
under a criterion that measures how close it is with the identified members of each class, preferably 
with the most representative ones. As in the case of the variance-based method, this measure should 
be used as a quantitative guideline regarding the degree of “responsibility” that each class manifests 
over this particular point in the feature space. In terms of classification, it is a statistical method of 
measuring how much a class is accountable for this new sample, but in a more invariant way than that 
of using Gaussian approximations for the class’ distributions. 
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When this fully adaptive version is adopted within the scope of the WMRs, each classifier’s posterior 
probability or “skill”, already known from the training process, can be adjusted according to how 
“far” or “close” an unclassified sample lies with respect to the already known members of this class. 
From a clearly topological point of view, this is a way to minimize the “structural risk” of the 
classification problem by introducing a bias or “preference” towards the class that seems to be more 
responsible for this region of the feature space. Although this is what each of the participating 
classifiers does on its own, this adaptation process essentially adjusts the process of evaluating the 
optimal WMR to the non-symmetrical structural properties of the feature space. Therefore, it is also 
expected that the weighting profile calculated for the WMR design would be optimal, not in a global 
but rather in a more local sense. 
 
2.3  A link with the theory of SVM  
SVM architectures provide the necessary foundations for a theoretical sound framework of optimal 
classifiers. The use of special form of kernel functions essentially makes them equivalent almost to any 
type of linear and non-linear pattern classification model. But the solid theoretical background of this 
type of classifiers makes them ideal in situations where their performance and consistency is required 
for studying collective decision rules. 
The linear form of the WMRs makes the combination process very simple, not only in terms of 
calculating the final outcome of the group decision, but also in the scope of statistical properties of this 
decision rule in relation to each classifier’s own properties. SVM theory states that the structure of the 
SVM classifier permits the linear transformation of a number of kernel functions into one combined 
linear form. Furthermore, if each of the kernel functions is well-defined under the typical constraints 
for SVM kernels, then their linear combination is also a well-defined SVM kernel function. This 
assertion is of extreme importance when viewed under the perspective of WMGs and WMRs. In 
essence, if all participating classifiers are assumed to be SVM realizations, then the optimal WMR itself 
defines a new compound SVM kernel, i.e., an SVM meta-classifier. 
This conclusion is an adequate justification on why such a combination rule does not need to be more 
complex than a linear transformation of each expert’s assessment: if every expert is of adequate skill 
and acts independently from the others. This means that such an expert can moderately efficient in the 
complete feature space or, alternatively, well-adapted to only a part of the complete feature space. In 
the first case, the WMR is optimal in the global sense in a way that combines the group of experts in 
the most promising manner, while the second case corresponds to the fully adaptive WMR realization 
that was proposed in the previous section. 
It should be noted that, although SVM classifiers are generally design for “hard” decision 
classifications in dichotomy choice problems, it is not difficult to design a set of SVM classifiers that 
are “specialized” in one of N>2 classes if the problem requires it – this is essentially the one-versus-all 
classification mode when applying binary pattern classifiers in multi-class tasks. Furthermore, their 
internal structure that is based on support vectors, i.e., class members that primarily define the 
classification outcome, is well-suited for the design of robust topological measures of “closure” 
between a class and a new unclassified sample, based on distance transformations from the support 
vectors of each candidate class. In this sense, even a two-class problem that is solved by a single SVM 
classifier can be viewed as a coalition game in the form of WMG, solved by an optimal WMR with 
weights and bias proportional to the class’ distribution characteristics, and an SVM kernel function 
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that effectively transforms the original non-linear feature space to a linear space of higher dimension 
that can be solved by this WMR. 
 
2.4  Conclusion and further work  
The material presented briefly in part-I of this report clearly define a solid background for a game-
theoretic approach to the problem of classifier combination in its general form. A set of theoretic 
formalizations lead to some very intuitive and simple solutions to this problem in the general sense, 
especially in dichotomy choice situations. 
An extension of these theories to the area of Pattern Recognition can be easily inferenced. Specifically, 
there are three main issues of special interest: 
1. The introduction of a theoretically solid model for using transformations of posterior 
probabilities of the classifiers, e.g. by the confusion matrices, in combination with 
the general framework of risk minimization, either in a post-training sense or within 
the training process itself (risk-based training). 
2. The formulation of a complete and fully adaptive realization of the WMR model that 
incorporates the non-symmetrical properties of the underlying feature space, when 
calculating the optimal weighting profile for the combination rule. 
3. The study of theoretical and practical implications of introducing SVM classifier 
architectures as voting players in a WMG, primarily in the scope of completeness 
and optimality of such a solution in the general sense. 
A study that addresses all these three issues should first focus on the theoretical aspects and formal 
definitions of any new models and algorithms, and subsequently conduct experimental tests on well-
known classification problems where comparative results are available for other typical classifier 
combination schemes. Based in the theoretical assessment presented in this study, it is expected that 
such a game-theoretic approach of collective decision, along with the application of SVM classifiers, 
will produce results of at least the same degree of success as the best ensemble methods available 
today. 
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